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Abstract 
This paper investigates why plants belonging to multi-plant firms are more likely to 
exit.  Using Japanese plant data linked to firm data we study the process of plant 
closure among domestic multi-plant firms as well as multi-plant multinationals.  As 
elsewhere in the literature these organisational forms are found to raise the probability 
of plant exit despite the superior characteristics of the plants they own.  We find that 
the domestic multi-plant ownership effect is attributable to these firms closing the 
weakest elements of the firm.  We reject the idea of multinationals being ‘footloose’ 
but instead find a residual effect of multinational ownership which reduces the 
probability of plant death when we control for the process of closure within those 
firms.  
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 Non-Technical Summary 
 
Plants owned by multi-plant firms are known to possess characteristics that reduce their 
likelihood of closure compared to single plant firms.  Their plants are generally larger, more 
capital intensive and more productive, all factors shown in numerous contexts to be negatively 
associated with the probability of exit.  Despite these qualities multi-plant firms are invariably 
found to be more likely to shutdown a plant regardless of whether the firm’s affiliates are 
located domestically or abroad.  For the United States Bernard and Jensen (2007) find that 
domestic multi-plant ownership raises the probability a plant will die by 4.2%.   
 
In this paper we use rich data that includes the characteristics of a firm and its plants to study 
the determinants of plant closure within multi-plant firms in Japan, including multinational firms. 
We find strong evidence that plants belonging to multi-plant firms are much more likely to shut 
plants compared to similar single plant firms and regardless of whether the firm has foreign 
affiliates or not.  There is evidence of a clear ordering of the likelihood of death according to 
ownership structure: relative to single-plant domestic firms, plants belonging to multi-plant 
multinationals are 292% more vulnerable to closure, multi-plant non-MNE firms are 134% more 
likely to shut plants, while single plant MNEs are 62% more likely to close down.   
 
We next consider the type of plants that are closed within multi-plant firms.  A high degree of 
similarity is found among those closed by domestic multi-plant firms and multi-plant 
multinationals.  The key differences being that domestic multi-plant firms are significantly more 
likely to keep open plants that are capital intensive and that pay high wages.   
 
In the final part of the analysis we consider whether it is this process of plant closure that 
explains why these ownership structures are associated with higher exit odds compared to 
single plant firms.  We find some support for this view for non-MNEs but not MNEs: once we 
control for the characteristics of plants relative to the rest of the firm, domestic multi-plant firms 
are no more likely to close a plant than a single plant firm.  However, when the same tests are 
performed on multinationals we find a residual impact of multi-plant MNE ownership that 
actually insulates plants against exit.  Therefore once we control for the characteristics of a 
plant relative to the rest of the firm, we reject the idea that multinationals are ‘footloose’. 
 1. Introduction 
 
The recent global financial crisis and the resulting global recession has highlighted the 
often severe, localised output and employment losses that occur when large firms 
close their plants. But which plants are most at risk of closure by parent firms? Are 
they really more likely to be shut than single plant firms with similar characteristics? 
Are they more likely to be owned by multinationals, in particular foreign 
multinationals? Are they concentrated in declining industries, or produce products 
that can be easily offshored?  
 
In this paper we use rich data that includes the characteristics of a firm and its plants 
to study the determinants of plant closure within multi-plant firms in Japan, including 
multinational firms. We find strong evidence that plants belonging to multi-plant 
firms are much more likely to shut plants compared to similar single plant firms and 
regardless of whether the firm has foreign affiliates or not.  There is evidence of a 
clear ordering of the likelihood of death according to ownership structure: relative to 
single plant domestic firms, plants belonging to multi-plant multinationals are 292% 
more vulnerable to closure, multi-plant non-MNE firms are 134% more likely to shut 
plants, while single plant MNEs are 62% more likely to close down.   
 
Building on this result we next explore the type of plants that are shut by multi-plant 
firms. Within this we consider the relative characteristics of plants compared to the 
rest of the firm, but also the behaviour of multinationals with respect to other multi-
plant firms that do not have overseas affiliates. The data on plants are sufficiently rich 
that we can do this for a wide range of characteristics including their size, capital 
intensity, average wage bill and material intensity.  We find from this a certain degree 
of similarity in the type of plants that are shut across MNEs and non-MNEs. Plants 
are more likely to be closed if they are small regardless of ownership structure for 
example. However, domestic multi-plant firms are more likely to keep open plants 
that are capital intensive and high wage relative to the rest of the firm; an indication 
that multi-plant firms without foreign affiliates are more concerned with closing the 
relatively small and capital un-intensive parts of their operations.   
 
  1As a final exercise we consider whether it is this process of plant closure that explains 
why these ownership structures are associated with higher exit odds compared to 
single plant firms.  We find some support for this view for non-MNEs but not MNEs: 
once we control for the characteristics of plants relative to the rest of the firm, 
domestic multi-plant firms are no more likely to close a plant than a single plant firm.  
However, when the same tests are performed on multinationals we find a residual 
impact of multi-plant MNE ownership that actually insulates plants against exit.   
Therefore once we control for the characteristics of a plant relative to the rest of the 
firm, we reject the idea that multinationals are ‘footloose’. 
 
In seeking explanations for the exit process of multi-plant firms, we build on a 
relatively small literature and which has focused narrowly on the question of whether 
multi-plant or multinational firms are more likely to close plants compared to single 
plant firms (the first question we explore).  Explanations for why multi-plant firms are 
more likely to shut plants range from declining industry arguments (Lieberman, 1990) 
to trade liberalisation (Gibson and Harris, 1996).  Harrigan (1980) and Baden-Fuller 
(1989) posit that one explanation for the positive correlation between multi-plant 
ownership and plant closure could be that large, diversified firms face fewer agency 
problems thereby making their plants more vulnerable to closure.  However, the 
existing empirical literature casts doubt on these hypotheses.  Specifically, Gibson 
and Harris (1996) find that the multi-plant firm effect remains robust to the inclusion 
of a firm diversity variable while Bernard and Jensen (2007) show that increasing 
dissimilarity between plant and parent does not affect the role played by multi-plant 
ownership. An alternative set of explanations focuses on demand conditions in the 
plant’s industry: Lieberman (1990) shows that multi-plant firms are more likely to 
close plants in declining industries for example. For Japan we find that declining 
industries, measured by the degree of import competition, or indeed measures of trade 
openness more generally, does not predict which plants are more likely to be closed. 
We also find no effect from whether the plant is in the same industry or a different 
industry of the parent   
 
Finally a separate strand of literature has shown multinational ownership to raise the 
probability of plant exit although the reasons for this ‘footloose’ effect of 
multinational ownership are not explored (Bandick, 2007; Kimura and Kiyota, 2006; 
  2Alvarez and Görg, 2005; Bernard and Jensen, 2007).  As explained above we find that 
this result does not hold once we control for plant relative to firm characteristics. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature on exit and multi-plant firms.  Section 3 describes the dataset we use.  In 
Section 4 we investigate the magnitude of the domestic multi-plant ownership and 
‘footloose’ effects.  Section 5 studies the determinants of exit within multi-plant 
firms.  In Section 6 we address what explains the multi-plant and multinational 
ownership effects.  Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 7.  
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Numerous hypotheses have been advanced to explain the effect of multi-plant 
ownership on plant death within the group.  Lieberman (1990), for example, shows 
that larger multi-plant firms are more likely to close plants in declining industries.  
Alternatively large, diversified firms may encounter fewer agency problems when 
deciding upon plant closure, making their plants less likely to survive relative to 
standalone plants (Harrigan, 1980; Baden-Fuller, 1989).  In their study of a period of 
trade liberalisation and quota reduction in New Zealand Gibson and Harris (1996) 
find that large, old, low cost establishments are more likely to survive the 
liberalisation episode but diversified multi-plant firms remain more likely to close 
plants.  Dissimilarity within the group is also found to increase the probability that a 
plant will exit by Bernard and Jensen (2007) but this does not explain the multi-plant 
ownership effect.  Related to this is the idea that strategic interactions within multi-
plant firms may be the source of the higher failure rates.  Where a multi-plant firm 
expands output or cuts price to improve the profit of one of its plants, it generates a 
negative externality for the other plants within the group (Sutton, 1997). 
 
A separate strand of literature has considered how ownership by a subset of multi-
plant firms affects survival.  Substantial evidence has accrued which has shown 
multinationals to be more likely to closedown plants even when multi-plant status is 
taken into account.  The regularity of these findings has been impressively robust 
across countries with similar evidence found for Sweden (Bandick, 2007), Japan 
(Kimura and Kiyota, 2006), Chile (Alvarez and Görg, 2005) and the United States 
  3(Bernard and Jensen, 2007) contributing to the idea of multinationals being 
‘footloose’. 
 
The theories used to explain the ‘footloose’ nature of multinational firms emphasise 
vertical over horizontal FDI motives.
1 Under vertical FDI multinational firms change 
the geography of their production plants in response to changes in local costs (as in 
for example Antras and Helpman, 2004).  They relocate low skill intensive activities 
for example, in countries that are low-skill abundant.
2  Empirically much of the 
literature has focused on the factors that make locations relatively attractive, either 
generally or specific determinants, rather than linking those FDI decisions and the 
closure of production units in a different location.
  3  Cowling and Sugden (1999) 
argue that wage costs, labour unrest, tax incentives and governmental subsidies are 
pivotal to the multinational location decision.  This view is echoed by Hood and 
Young (1997) who stress that multinationals in the United Kingdom only have 
“shallow roots” and are not fully integrated into the local economy.
4  O r  m o r e  
narrowly Devereux and Griffith (1998) focus on the roles of taxation and 
agglomeration.  They find that conditional on producing in Europe, industries with 
lower effective tax rates attract more U.S. multinationals.  Finally, recent theories of 
economic geography suggest that firms within the same industry may be drawn 
together through spillovers created by agglomeration effects.  Evidence in support of 
these models can be found in Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Head et al. (1995).  
 
A smaller number of papers have focused on the consequences of outward FDI 
decisions for other aspects of the firm. Head and Ries (2002), Brainard and Riker 
(1997a,b) and Braconier and Ekholm (2000) all find that firms undertaking outward 
FDI is associated with changes in employment levels and the skill-mix of workers at 
home. Most closely associated with this paper is the work of Simpson (2008). Using 
data for the UK she finds that overseas investment in low-wage economies leads to 
changes in the structure of firms, the closure of plants. These effects are found to be 
                                                 
1 Under horizontal FDI all stages of the production process are replicated in a different location. 
Models of this type include Markusen (1984) and Brainard (1997).  
2 In practice FDI decisions often contain elements of both horizontal and vertical motives. For 
theoretical models consistent with this view see Helpman (1984) Venables (1999) and Yeaple (2003). 
3 A more comprehensive review of this literature can be found in Blonigen (2005).  
4 Similarly, the ability of multinationals to shift production across borders is emphasised by Rodrik 
(1997) as an explanation for multinational’s relatively higher elasticity of demand for labour. 
  4strongest for multinationals operating in low-skilled industries with affiliates located 
in low-skill abundant countries compared to firms in the same industry not investing 
in low wage countries.  
 
3.  Data and Summary 
 
Our primary data sources are the linked longitudinal data sets of the Census of 
Manufactures (COM) and the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and 
Activities (BSJBSA) for the period 1994-2005.  The COM data is an establishment-
level dataset administered by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).  
The COM data covers all plants with more than 3 employees located in Japan and 
includes information on plant characteristics, such as their location, number of 
employees, tangible assets, and value of shipments. Summary statistics of the main 
plant variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
{INSERT TABLE 1} 
 
The plant data is linked to the BSJBSA, a firm-level survey also conducted by METI. 
The survey includes all firms with more than 50 employees or with capital in excess 
of 30 million yen. This data source provides information on corporate characteristics 
such as R&D activity, exports, imports, the foreign ownership ratio, foreign direct 
investment, and financial details.  The use of the BSJBSA restricts our regression 
analysis to include only firms with more than 50 employees, while the lack of data on 
intangible assets, necessary in the construction of TFP, means we are also forced to 
exclude plants with less than 10 employees.  Given our interest in the behaviour of 
multi-plant firms these are not thought to be serious exclusion restrictions. The 
average size of multi-plant firms within our dataset is 514, while for multinationals 
this figure is even higher at 1,490.  In comparison single plant firms are 
approximately 7% of this size.  
 
There are 23,100 observations of multinational firms within the data, 16,970 of multi-
plant firms that are not multinational and 74,264 observations of single plant firms. 
These multinationals are mostly Japanese owned; foreign owned firms represent 
  5around 1 percent of all firms.
5  Summary statistics of the firm variables are shown in 
Table 2. 
 
{INSERT TABLE 2} 
 
In addition to the differences in average size multinationals and multi-plant firms are 
shown to be different in Table 2 across a number of dimensions. There is for example 
a clear decline in productivity and capital intensity from multinationals to multi-plant 
firms and standalone enterprises.  Japanese firms appear to be highly globalised: 29% 
export, 25% import and 18% conduct FDI.  However, these patterns are far from 
uniform across firm type.  Some 78% of multinational firms export while only 18% of 
single plant firms have any sales abroad. Overall it would seem that Japanese MNEs 
display characteristics relative to other types of firm that are consistent with those 
found elsewhere in the literature (see for example the reviews in Greenaway and 
Kneller, 2007, and Wagner, 2007). 
 
To identify plant entry and exit, we use a unique identification number given to each 
plant. A plant is deemed to have entered where it is observed at time t but was not 
observed in the dataset in the previous period, t-1.  Equivalently, an exiting plant is 
one that was observed at t-1 but not at time t.  A limitation of the data is that it is not 
possible to identify firm closure separately from employment falling below 3 and 
therefore exit from the sample.
6  However, given that the average exiting plant 
employs 131 workers we are confident that we are capturing closure.  
 
In Table 3 we report the entry and exit rates for each year of our sample and by the 
type of firm. A general observation would be that the percentage of firms that either 
enter or exit in the sample is low in Japan. Throughout the sample there are 2,230 
instances of entry and 3,392 observations of exit.  This feature of Japanese 
manufacturing has been previously commented on by Caballero et al. (2003), Peek 
and Rosengren (2003) and Ahearne and Shinada (2005). It is however consistent with 
                                                 
5 Görg and Strobl (2003) also use the 50% criteria.  The value rises (but remains low) to 1.8% if we 
define foreign ownership according to the International Monetary Fund’s definition as being when a 
foreign firm holds in excess of 25% of capital. 
6 We are more confident that we are not misclassifying mergers and acquisition as exit.  The number of 
mergers in Japan is low.   Shimizu (2001 cited in Kimura and Fujii, 2003) reports that of all companies 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between 1949 and 1998 of 1273 only 78 have conducted mergers. 
  6the high average age of firms reported in Table 2, which even for single plant firms is 
over 40 years. We conclude from this average age that the low rate of exit is not likely 
explained by the size threshold imposed on the Japanese census data of 3 employees.
7  
This rate of exit is much lower than that found for other developed countries such as 
the US, where Bernard and Jensen (2004) calculate 32 per cent of plants are shut over 
a 5 year period. Finally, the table also reveals that the rate of plant exit is similar 
amongst single, multi-plant firms and MNEs. 
 
{INSERT TABLE 3} 
 
In Table 4 we compare the characteristics of continuing, entering and exiting plants, 
again separated by their organisation. In general the table shows that continuing plants 
are on average larger, have higher capital intensities, have greater sales, use more 
intermediate inputs and are more productive than exiting or entering plants.  They pay 
higher wages than entering plants, but lower wages than exiting plants.  On average, 
continuing plants are the most productive.  Exiting plants are smaller, use fewer 
intermediate inputs and have fewer sales than either continuing or entering plants.  
They also pay higher wages.  Table 4 suggests that, on average, these plants are not as 
productive as continuing plants, but are more productive than entrants.   
 
Ownership also appears to matter.  There is considerable heterogeneity in the size, 
productivity and capital intensity of plants depending on their owners and whether 
they enter, exit or continue.  Multinationals’ plants pay higher wages, have higher 
sales and use more intermediate inputs, regardless of whether they are an entering, 
exiting or continuing plant.  T-tests reveal that non-MNE owned plants are 




{INSERT TABLE 4} 
 
                                                 
7 Indeed the average exiting plant employs 131 workers and depending upon firm type employment at 
exiting plants ranges from 96 to 217 workers.   
8 T-tests are computed by subtracting the mean of group j from the mean value of group i to find the 
difference.  A t-test is then run where the null hypothesis is that the differences between the means are 
zero. 
  74.  How Does Multi-Plant Ownership Affect Survival? 
 
To investigate how ownership structure affects plant survival we generate four 
ownership dummy variables. 
 
  MNE
M = 1 if the firm owns more than one plant and conducts FDI, 0  
       otherwise 
 
  MNE
S = 1 if the firm owns one plant and conducts FDI, 0 otherwise 
 
  MUL  =  1 if the firm owns more than one plant but does not conduct FDI, 0 
         otherwise 
 
  SIN  =  1 if the firm owns one plant and does not conduct FDI, 0 otherwise 
 
In the regressions that follow domestic single plant firms (SIN) act as the base 
category.  To investigate the role of ownership we employ survival analysis.  The 
hazard function, h(t), is defined as the rate at which plants exit in the interval between 
t and t+1 conditional upon having survived until t.  Failure is defined as when a plant 
exits and survival is the number of years the plant is present in the dataset.  The 
hazard rate is specified as  
 
         ( 1 )   () ()
β X e t h t h 0 =
 
where h0 is the baseline hazard.  X is a vector containing plant, firm and industry 
variables.  Throughout the analysis a Cox proportional hazards model is used due to 
its flexibility though we also use duration models to ensure our results are not a 
product of unobserved heterogeneity.  Using a Cox model also implicitly incorporates 
entry into the model.  A hazard ratio less than 1 indicates that an explanatory variable 
reduces the probability of exit while values in excess of 1 implies a greater risk of 
failure.   
 
  8A range of plant, firm and industry variables such as plant size, firm export status and 
measures of import penetration are included in the regression to capture factors that 
have been shown to affect survival in other contexts.  In order that we capture time-
varying industry characteristics we measure these plant variables relative to the 















size l n .      ( 2 )  
 
For example, as shown in equation (2) plant size is calculated as the natural logarithm 
of the number of workers in plant i divided by the average number of plant employees 
in plant i's industry, j.  We construct similar measures for productivity, wages and 
capital and material intensity.
9 
 
Generally we find that the plants that are most vulnerable to closure in Japan are 
similar to those studied in other countries by Dunne et al. (1989), Görg and Strobl 
(2003), Mata and Portugal (1994), Bernard and Sjoholm (2003) and Bernard and 
Jensen (2007).  Plants that are large, productive and capital intensive are less likely to 
exit.  Of the plant characteristics it is size that has the strongest effect on reducing the 
hazard rate by 72.3% while the point estimates on the capital intensity and TFP 
variables are closer to one at 0.81 and 0.57. Contrary to Bernard and Jensen’s (2007) 
findings for the United States, high-wage Japanese plants are more likely to exit.  To 
capture the how the plant’s position in the production chain affects its survival we 
also include a measure of the input intensity (or material intensity) of the plant 
relative to the firm.  Input intensity is defined as the ratio of intermediate inputs to 
sales. We interpret higher values as indicating upstream production. The results 
suggest that firms are more likely to close plants producing intermediate inputs rather 
than final goods.   
 
Unlike in studies of other countries we do not find firm exporting status to affect 
survival.  Elsewhere in the literature exporters have been found to be less likely to 
                                                 
9 When the plant variables are included by themselves, rather than relative to the industry, the results 
remain robust. 
  9close due to their superior characteristics (see The International Study Group on 
Exports and Productivity, (2007) for a cross-country comparison).  Although 
exporters are often believed to be less likely vulnerable to closure, the reason why this 
should be is not necessarily apparent.
10  However, international engagement matters 
when the firm imports.  In this case a plant faces a hazard 23.2 percent above the 
baseline, a first indication that offshoring may be a motive behind the decision to shut 
plants.  We also find that the firm’s R&D intensity has little effect upon a plant’s 
survival.  However, when the plant characteristics are excluded in regression 3 R&D 
intensity becomes significantly negatively correlated with failure.  This indicates that 
firms with high R&D intensities tend to own plants that are larger, more productive 
etc. 
 
Across the sample there are 53338 observations of multinational owned plants.   
Although 78% of this group are also multi-plant firms this means that there are still a 
large number of single-plant multinational firms.  In later regressions we exploit this 
variation to investigate whether the ‘footloose’ effect is attributable to multinationals 
being predominantly multi-plant firms.  A clear ordering of the probability of plant 
exit is found in regression 1 according to multiplant and MNE status.  Relative to 
domestic single-plant firms we find that multi-plant multinationals are the most likely 
to shutdown their plants followed by domestic multi-plant firms and then single-plant 
multinationals.  The premium upon plant survival within the multinational category 
differs substantially according to whether the firm owns more than one plant: multi-
plant MNEs raise the hazard by 292% compared with 62% for single-plant 
multinationals.  The existing evidence on the link between survival and multi-plant 
ownership is ambiguous.  After controlling for plant features, Bernard and Jensen 
(2007) find that there is no difference in the likelihood of exit for plants owned by a 
multi-plant firm in the United States, while Mata and Portugal (1994) and Bandick 
(2007) find the contrary results for Portugal and Sweden respectively.  For Japan we 
find that belonging to a domestic multi-plant firm increases the hazard by 
approximately 134%.  This indicates that patterns of exit are similar across multi-
plant firms regardless of whether they have foreign affiliates and that the footloose 
effect is not confined to multinationals alone.  
                                                 
10 Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) show the productivity distributions of exporting and non-exporting 
firms to greatly overlap. 
  10{INSERT TABLE 5} 
 
Of the remaining industry level control variables included in regression 1 of Table 5, 
only industry sunk costs are found to have a significant effect on exit. This supports 
evidence from Dunne et al. (1988, 1989) and Bernard and Jensen (2007) for the US, 
Geroski (1991a, 1991b) for the UK and Greenaway et al. (2008) for Sweden. For 
Japan we do not find industry measures of globalisation to affect exit.  This contrasts 
with the evidence from Bernard et al. (2006) who found that imports from both low-
wage and other countries increase the probability that a plant will die in the United 
States, and is a feature of the results discussed in greater detail in Inui et al. (2010). 
 
In regression 3 we test the extent to which the evidence for multinationals being more 
likely to close plants is conditional on the inclusion of other plant controls.  We test 
this by excluding the other plant controls.  We continue to observe that domestic 
multi-plant firms, multinationals and importers are significantly more likely to 
shutdown their plants.  In contrast with Bernard and Jensen’s (2002) findings for the 
United States we find that this view of multinationals as footloose is unconditional. 
More generally multinationals are more likely to closedown their plants than single-
plant domestic firms. 
 
In the remaining regressions of the table we consider the robustness of our findings to 
different estimation techniques.  A particular concern is that the results may be a 
product of unobserved heterogeneity.  To control for this we estimate the model using 
a duration model with the hazard rate assumed to follow a Weibull distribution and 
unobserved heterogeneity parameterised by a gamma distribution.  The results in 
regression 2 of Table 5 are robust to this change.  We continue to find that large, 
capital intensive, productive plants with low wage costs are less likely to exit as are 
materially intensive plants.  The firm-level variables are also unchanged.  Importers 
and domestic multi-plant firms remain more likely to close plants, as are both types of 
multinationals.  Sunk costs continue to be the sole significant industry-level 
determinant of exit.  The duration parameter, theta, is found to be insignificant with a 
t-statistic of 0.39.  Unreported cumulative hazard plots also show our model to be 
correctly specified.  When we exclude the plant variables from the model in 
regression 4 the duration parameter becomes significant.  However, the following 
  11regressions include the variables used in regression 3 which leads us to conclude the 
results are not an artefact of unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
5.  Exit within Multi-plant Firms 
 
Given that multi-plant firms in general have been shown to be more likely to shut 
their plants, an interesting question that follows from this is, can we identify the 
characteristics of those plants and the possible motives behind their closure. In Table 
6 we consider these questions separately for multi-plant firms that only have 
operations domestically and those with foreign affiliates. In the following regressions 
in addition to the existing plant variables the plant variables are measured relative to 
the firm 
 












l n .      ( 3 )  
 
For example, the relative size ratio is the natural logarithm of the number of plant 
employees in plant i divided by the number of workers employed by the firm, f, that 
owns that plant as shown in equation (3).  Similar measures are constructed for wages, 
capital and input intensity.  Difficulties in comparing productivity across possibly 
different industries of the firm lead us to exclude this variable from this part of the 
analysis.  
 
A feature of the results in Table 6 is the high degree of similarity between the type of 
plants that are closed by multinationals and domestic multi-plant firms. For example, 
regardless of whether the firm has affiliates abroad or not, plants that are large, high 
productivity and materially intensive are less vulnerable to closure.  Moreover, plants 
that are large relative to the firm face significantly lower hazard rates although the 
effect is stronger for plants with domestic only owners.  Plants that are capital intense 
relative to the firm are more likely to survive but only among domestic multi-plant 
firms.  For both types of firm we continue to observe that plants paying high wages 
relative to the industry are approximately twice as vulnerable to close; an indication 
of outsourcing.  However, conditional upon this plants which pay relatively high 
  12wages within domestic multi-plant firms face lower hazard rates.  This may be an 
indication that domestic multi-plant firms tend to concentrate production among their 
best plants. 
 
{INSERT TABLE 6} 
 
We also include in the regression a variable indicating whether the plant operates in 
the same 3 digit industry as the firm itself. Kimura and Fujii (2003) have previously 
suggested that plant closure in Japan was attributable to firm’s expansion into 
industries outside their core competencies in the 1980s.  We do not find this to be the 
case. Similarly exporting status continues to be an insignificant determinant of exit 
but now so too is the import dummy.  This suggests differences in hazard rates 
between multi-plant and single-plant firms were driving this relationship in Table 5.  
Finally there are reasons to believe that that a firm’s R&D expenditure may affect the 
markets in which a firm operates.  Baldwin and Gu (2004) find Canadian exporters to 
perform more R&D than non-exporters.   For Spain, Perez et al. (2004) find that R&D 
intensity lowers the hazard rate.  Kimura and Kiyota (2003) also find Japanese firms 
which conduct R&D face lower hazard rates.  R&D intensity lowers the probability of 
exit only among domestic multi-plant firms where a one standard deviation increase 
in firm R&D intensity reduces the threat of closure by 7 percentage points. 
 
The effect of the industry-level variables remains similar to those found in Table 5, in 
particular the globalisation variables are again not found to affect closure among 
multi-plant firms.  The sunk cost variable remains significant but only for 
multinational owned plants suggesting they tend to operate in industries with more 
competition. 
 
In regression 3 we test whether the behaviour of MNEs and non-MNEs can be more 
formally accepted as different. We pool the observations on all multi-plant firms and 
then include a multinational dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm is 
either a domestic or foreign multi-plant multinational and zero if the owner is a 
domestic multi-plant firm and then interact this variable with the plant, firm and 
industry variables. For reasons of space we report the coefficient estimates for the 
  13interactions between the multinational variable and the plant, firm and industry 
variables only.  The results of the full model may be found in Appendix Table 2.   
 
The results from this regression confirm that multinationals and multi-plant non-
MNEs behave similarly in their choice about which plants to shut. In this sense 
domestic MNEs are no more likely to shutdown plants than domestic multi-plant 
firms.  The interactions only show a few significant differences between the criteria 
used to close plants across these firms.  Specifically, multinationals are significantly 
more likely to close relatively large plants and those that are capital un-intensive.  
Likewise the R&D intensity interaction shows domestic multi-plant firms with high 
R&D intensities are significantly less likely to close plants than similar 
multinationals.  We also find that industry sunk costs are more important within 
multinationals. 
 
6.  Why Does Ownership Matter? 
 
The results in the previous section showed that domestic multi-plant firms are more 
likely to close relatively small and capital un-intensive plants; traditional indicators of 
weakness.  Given that on average plants owned by domestic multi-plant firms display 
superior performance characteristics compared to single plant firms, in this section of 
the paper we consider two hypotheses.  First, whether the positive signs on the multi-
plant and MNE dummies in Table 5 can be explained by the attributes of the plants 
they close.  The second test builds on the evidence in Table 6 and asks whether it is 
this process of closing plants that are weaker relative to the rest of the firm that 
explains the footloose qualities of multi-plant firms in general in Table 5.   
 
The introduction of interactions between the plant variables and the multi-plant MNE, 
single-plant MNE and domestic multi-plant firm indicators in regression 1 of Table 7 
is capable of explaining the footloose nature of single-plant multinationals.   
Conditional on plant, firm and industry characteristics we find the material intensity 
of plants closed by single-plant multinationals that explains their footloose nature.  
Specifically, exit is decreasing in the plant’s material intensity.  We also find that 
large plants face higher hazards when owned by single-plant firms but this result is 
conditional and due to the inclusion of the plant size variable. 
  14 
While plant characteristics are capable of explaining why single-plant multinationals 
are found to raise the probability of plant death the same cannot be said for multi-
plant MNEs and domestic multi-plant firms.  However, we do see that the plant 
characteristics do affect survival.  For example, conditional upon plant characteristics, 
larger, productive and high wage plants face higher hazard ratios when owned by 
multi-plant multinationals.  Among domestic multi-plant firms more productive plants 
are more liable to closure.  However, these results largely reflect the absolute 
differences between plants owned by these firm types relative to the base category, 
domestic single-plant firms. 
 
We return to the issue of whether it is the characteristics of plants relative to their 
parent that explains why multi-plant firms in general are associated with lower 
survival rates.  To examine whether there is a specific footloose effect or whether this 
is attributable to the multi-plant characteristics of many MNEs we introduce an 
interaction term between the multi-plant MNE (0/1) indicator and the plant relative to 
firm variables from Table 6.  If multinationals are inherently footloose then we would 
expect to observe similar hazard ratios for the multi-plant and single-plant MNE 
variables when we control for the type of plants that are closed within multi-plant 
multinationals.  Similar interaction effects are included for domestic multi-plant firms 
as well. 
 
The evidence presented in column 2 of Table 7 suggests a difference in the survival 
rate according to the ownership of the firm: multi-plant multinationals appear to be 
concerned with their production chain while domestic multi-plant firms keep open 
their best plants.  For example, plants that are large and capital intensive relative to 
the firm are less vulnerable to exit when owned by a domestic multi-plant firm.   
However, among multi-plant MNEs these variables are insignificant but plants that 
are relatively material intensive within the group have higher survival rates.  Given 
that one motive for closing upstream plants producing intermediate inputs is to take 
advantage of lower production costs abroad it would seem that this has predominantly 
affected multinational firms within Japan. 
 
  15When the relative plant variables are included in the regression multi-plant 
multinationals are no longer footloose.  Rather plants belonging to multi-plant MNEs 
face a hazard 89.2% lower than the baseline.  Hence, when we condition upon the 
process of plant closure among multi-plant multinational firms we find that rather 
than being footloose they are significantly less likely to close their plants.  This 
residual impact may be due to superior organisational characteristics.  For example, 
pan-national organisations possess managerial capabilities to enable the coordination 
of production across borders.  Alternatively where a multinational decides to locate 
more than one plant in a country may be an indication of the importance of that 
market to the MNE or that it is favourable to produce in that country.  Finally, the 
characteristics of plants relative to their parents render the domestic multi-plant 
dummy insignificant.  The literature suggests that multi-plant ownership raises the 
probability that a plant will die.  Our results suggest that this trait of multi-plant 
ownership is due to the closure of the weakest plants by domestic multi-plant firms 
and changes in production chains by multi-plant multinationals.  As in Harris and 
Hassaszadeh (2002) it appears that multi-plant firms often prefer plant closure to 
spreading reductions in capacity across all plants within the group. 
 
{INSERT TABLE 7} 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated why multi-plant ownership is frequently found to raise the 
probability of plant death using unique Japanese data that links plant data with firm 
data.  We find that the positive link between domestic multi-plant ownership and the 
probability of plant exit is explained by these firms closing the weakest elements of 
the group.  In particular, plants that are small and that are capital un-intensive relative 
to the firm face significantly higher exit likelihoods when owned by a domestic multi-
plant firm.  In contrast multi-plant multinational firms are more likely to shut plants 
that lie further upstream in the production process relative to the rest of the firm.  
However, we find that this does not explain the ‘footloose’ nature of multinational 
ownership.  Rather there is a residual impact of multinational ownership that reduces 
the probability of closure which may reflect organisational competences.   
 
  16The above results have a potentially interesting implication for aggregate productivity 
growth in Japan. Within the Melitz (2003) model of heterogenous firms and 
international trade, trade liberalisation is welfare improving because it leads to the 
death of the least productive firms.  Subsequently, their output is then reallocated 
towards more productive firms within the industry which raises aggregate 
productivity.  An assumption of the model is that the least productive firms will 
always be the ones that exit.  However, our results suggest that when a plant is weaker 
compared to other units within the same firm, but both larger and more productive 
relative to other firms in the same industry, its death could disrupt the positive effect 
that increased globalisation is predicted to have on aggregate industry productivity. 
Based on a Griliches and Regev decomposition of aggregate productivity growth we 
find for Japan that this effect is small. Entry and exit account for 0 per cent of total 
aggregate productivity growth.
11 This is perhaps explained by the Japanese context 
which has been characterised by both low productivity growth (Inui et al., 2010, ) and 
low rates of entry and exit (Caballero et al., 2003; Peek and Rosengren, 2003; 
Ahearne and Shinada, 2005; and Inui et al., 2009). It would therefore be interesting to 
investigate this possible negative effect of globalisation in other contexts. 
 
 
                                                 
11 This finding is robust to the use of a Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) decomposition. 
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  20Tables 
 
Table 1: Plant Variables across the Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Plant size 169590 225 489 10 21309
   Number of employees
Capital 169590 5119 23240 .07 1052705
   Millions of Japanese yen
TFP 169590 .96 .35 -4.81 4.36
   Total factor productivity
Wages 169590 4.84 1.79 .03 90.55
   Millions of Japanese yen
Intermediate inputs 169590 6669 39879 .10 4276681
   Millions of Japanese yen
Sales 169590 11321 54454 2.88 5855928
   Millions of Japanese yen
 
 
Table 2: Firm-level Variables by Type of Firm
Variable/Sample Firm Type
MNE Multi-plant Single Plant
Observations 23100 16970 74264
A g e 4 94 54 1
   In years
Size 1490 514 190
   Number of workers
Capital per worker 20.92 15.36 14.22
   Millions of Japanese yen
Firm TFP 1.01 .96 .95
   Total factor productivity
R&D complexity .02 .01 .01
   R&D divided by firm sales
Intermediate inputs 71924 15410 5052
   Millions of Japanese yen
Foreign ownership dummy .01 .01 .01
   1 if a foreign firm holds more than 50% of equity
Export dummy .78 .24 .18
   1 if the firm exports
Import dummy .65 .19 .15
   1 if the firm imports
Notes: The MNE group comprises both single- and multi-plant multinationals.  ‘Multi-plant’ refers to 
domestic multi-plant firms. 
 
 
  21Table 3: Annual Entry and Exit Rates
Sample           Sample              MNE Domestic Multi-Plant        Single-Plant
Year/Indica Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit
1994 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
1995 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
1996 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
1997 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02
1998 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03
1999 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .04 .01 .03
2000 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03
2001 .02 .03 .01 .03 .02 .03 .02 .03
2002 .01 .03 .02 .03 .01 .02 .01 .03
2003 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02
2004 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02
2005 .02 - .02 - .02 - .02 -
 
 
  22Table 4: Characteristics of Continuing, Entering and Exiting Plants by Firm Type
Variable/Firm Type Firm Type
Sample MNE Multiplant Single Plant
Continue
Observations 51381 40013 72699
Plant size 423 144 136
   Number of employees
Capital per worker 25.59 14.41 12.23
   Millions of Japanese yen
Plant TFP 1.03 .94 .92
   Total factor productivity
Plant wages 5.57 4.51 5.51
   Millions of Japanese yen
Intermediate inputs 15558 3156 2530
   Millions of Japanese yen
Plant sales 26275 5478 4320
   Millions of Japanese yen
Exit
Observations 1316 1237 839
Plant size 207 76 97
   Number of employees
Capital per worker 28.22 14.77 11.76
   Millions of Japanese yen
Plant TFP 1.02 .88 .90
   Total factor productivity
Plant wages 6.16 4.56 4.53
   Millions of Japanese yen
Intermediate inputs 6819 1678 1721
   Millions of Japanese yen
Plant sales 11678 2904 3004
   Millions of Japanese yen
Enter
Observations 680 798 752
Plant size 244 112 107
   Number of employees
Capital per worker 30.79 19.37 15.90
   Millions of Japanese yen
Plant TFP .95 .86 .89
   Total factor productivity
Plant wages 4.94 3.86 4.35
   Millions of Japanese yen
Intermediate inputs 8205 2513 2197
   Millions of Japanese yen
Plant sales 14447 4285 3480
   Millions of Japanese yen
 
  23Notes: The MNE group comprises both single- and multi-plant multinationals.  ‘Multi-plant’ refers to 
domestic multi-plant firms. 
 
  24Table 5: Cox Proportional Hazard Regressions
Variable/Regression 1 2 3 4
Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
Multiplant MNE dummy 3.92 3.911 3.19 4.086
(18.33)** (17.56)** (16.26)** (14.21)**
Single plant MNE dummy 1.623 1.647 1.391 1.498
(4.60)** (4.62)** (3.16)** (3.21)**
Domestic multiplant dummy 2.338 2.308 3.149 4.216
(14.86)** (14.17)** (20.83)** (16.53)**
Plant Variables Relative to Industry Variables
Size 0.300 0.284
(28.13)** (27.54)**






Material intensity 0.745 0.732
(6.78)** (6.86)**
Firm Variables
Export dummy 0.993 0.99 0.929 0.906
(0.11) (0.14) (1.11) (1.18)
Import dummy 1.223 1.236 1.162 1.205
(3.09)** (3.14)** (2.39)* (2.35)*
R&D intensity 1.002 1.001 0.979 0.972
(0.65) (0.46) (7.39)** (7.69)**
Industry Variables
Grubel-Lloyd index 0.885 0.879 0.91 0.868
(0.88) (0.93) (0.67) (0.79)
LWPEN 1.05 1.049 1.045 1.044
(0.46) (0.45) (0.41) (0.33)
OTHPEN 0.897 0.911 0.96 0.959
(0.62) (0.53) (0.23) (0.18)
Sunk costs 0.958 0.959 0.96 0.952
(2.89)** (2.88)** (2.76)** (2.63)**
Theta 0.00 16.72
(0.39) (3.66)
Log pseudolikelihood -31106 -13973 -32462 -15391
Wald Statistic 4567.39 3792.53 1292 1330.06
Number of observations 131669 131669 131669 131669
 
Notes: Cox Proportional hazards model is used in regressions 1, 2, 3 and 5.  A duration model is used 
in regressions 4 and 6 with the hazard parameterised using a Weibull distribution and unobserved 
heterogeneity assumed to be gamma distributed.  Z-scores are clustered at the firm level and reported in 
  25parentheses. The multinational dummy includes domestic and foreign multinationals.  The industry 
dummies include controls for the both the plant and firm's industry. **, * and + indicate significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence. 
 
  26Table 6: Exit within Multiplant Firms
Sample MNE Multi Both
Variable/Regression 1 2 3
Plant Variables Relative to Firm Variables
Size 0.804 0.738 1.202
(1.71)+ (3.32)** (1.67)+
Capital Intensity 0.871 0.729 1.168
(1.50) (5.04)** (1.61)
Wages 1.001 0.719 1.534
(0.01) (2.01)* (1.90)+
Material Intensity 0.922 1.011 0.9
(1.52) (0.32) (2.28)*
Plant Variables Relative to Industry Variables
Size 0.382 0.312 1.155
(7.49)** (11.75)** (1.34)
Capital intensity 0.811 1.032 0.815
(2.20)* (0.51) (2.06)*
TFP 0.599 0.601 1.002
(4.37)** (4.92)** (0.01)
Wages 2.306 2.056 1.028
(4.34)** (4.63)** (0.12)
Material intensity 0.741 0.845 0.896
(3.19)** (2.53)* (1.06)
Firm Variables
Export dummy 0.965 0.878 1.186
(0.27) (1.27) (1.04)
Import dummy 1.042 1.153 0.868
(0.37) (1.31) (0.93)
R&D intensity 0.996 0.986 1.016
(0.49) (2.92)** (1.82)+





Grubel-Lloyd index 1.032 0.848 1.099
(0.12) (0.73) (1.10)
LWPEN 1.152 1.094 1.052
(0.74) (0.52) (1.04)
OTHPEN 1.029 0.602 1.021
(0.10) (1.54) (0.26)
Sunk costs 0.934 0.983 0.951
(2.66)** (0.70) (1.66)+
Log pseudolikelihood -9222 -10218 -20894
Wald Statistic 13220 13890 8832
Number of observations 131669 131669 131669
 
  27Notes: Z-scores are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The multinational dummy 
includes domestic and foreign multinationals.  ‘Multi’ refers to domestic multi-plant firms.  The 
industry dummies include controls for the both the plant and firm's industry. **, * and + indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence. 
 
  28Table 7: Differences in Hazard Rates between Groups
Base category S DOM S DOM
Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
Multiplant MNE dummy 3.813 .108
(5.93)** (3.27)**
Singleplant MNE dummy 1.926 2.057
(1.54) (1.66)+
Domestic multiplant dummy 1.546 .578
(2.04)* (.98)
Multi-plant MNE dummy interacted with
   Plant relative to firm size .993
(.08)
   Plant relative to firm capital intensity .926
(.96)
   Plant relative to firm wages 1.165
(.99)
   Plant relative to firm material intensity .847
(4.44)**
Domestic multi-plant dummy interacted with
   Plant relative to firm size .833
(2.27)*
   Plant relative to firm capital intensity .778
(4.23)**
   Plant relative to firm wages .782
(1.61)
   Plant relative to firm material intensity .955
(1.41)
Multi-plant MNE dummy interacted with
   Size 1.421 1.241
(4.05)** (2.13)*
   Capital intensity 1.025 .984
(.42) (.17)
   TFP 1.543 1.353
(2.20)* (1.51)
   Wages 2.069 1.325
(3.32)** (1.07)
   Material intensity .942 1.021
(.52) (.18)
Single-plant MNE dummy interacted with
   Size 1.302 1.319
(1.66)+ (1.71)+
   Capital intensity 1.116 1.119
(1.02) (1.02)
   TFP 1.165 1.148
(.40) (.35)
   Wages 1.190 1.212
(.48) (.53)
   Material intensity .582 .569
(2.41)* (2.43)*
Domestic multi-plant dummy interacted with
   Size .945 1.008
(.67) (.09)
   Capital intensity 1.030 1.225
(.56) (2.88)**
   TFP 1.530 1.419
(2.22)* (1.78)+
   Wages 1.174 1.199
(.71) (.77)
   Material intensity 1.184 1.167
(1.64) (1.47)
 
  29Table 7 continued
Base category S DOM S DOM
Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
Plant Variables Relative to Industry Variables
Size .255 .254
(18.53)** (17.66)**






Material intensity .722 .755
(3.84)** (3.22)**
Firm Variables
Export dummy .994 .980
(.10) (.31)
Import dummy 1.222 1.174
(3.06)** (2.48)*
Firm R&D intensity 1.002 .992
(.73) (2.57)*
Industry Variables






Sunk costs .958 .955
(2.91)** (3.11)**
Log pseudo likelihood -31035 -30857
Wald Statistic 3353 3856
Number of observations 131669 131648
 
 
Notes: Z-scores are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The multinational dummy 
includes domestic and foreign multinationals.  ‘Multi’ refers to domestic multi-plant firms.  The 
industry dummies include controls for the both the plant and firm's industry. **, * and + indicate 













  30Appendix 
 
Total Factor Productivity 
 
There are 48 manufacturing industries in our dataset.  Total factor productivity (TFP) 
is calculated for each plant relative to the industry average.  Following Good et al. 
(1997) and Aw et al. (1997), we define the TFP level of establishment p in year t in a 
certain industry in comparison with the TFP level of a hypothetical representative 
establishment in year 0 in that industry as follows 
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where Qft, Sift and Xift denote the gross output of plant f in year t, the cost share of 
factor i for establishment p’s input of factor i in year t.  Variables with an upper bar 
denote the industry average of that variable.  We use 1994 as the base year.  Capital, 
labour and real intermediate inputs are used as factor inputs.   
 
  The representative establishment for each industry is defined as a hypothetical 
establishment whose gross output as well as input and cost share of all production 
factors are identical to the industry average.  The first two terms on the right hand 
side of equation (1) denote the gap between plant f’s TFP level in year t and the 
representative establishment’s TFP level in year t and the representative 
establishment’s TFP level in the base year.  lnTFPft in equation (1) constitutes the 
gap between establishment f’s TFP level in year t and the representative 




Globalisation has been shown to cause exit.  The source of import competition in the 
US affects plant survival and causes firms to adjust their product mix (Bernard and 
Jensen, 2002; Bernard et al., 2006).  We disaggregate import penetration into low-
  31wage import penetration (LWPEN) and import penetration from all other countries 
(OTHPEN)




















where LWPENit represents low-wage country import competition in industry i at time 
t, Mit
LW is the value of imports from low-wage countries in industry i at time t, Mit  
and Xit represents the value of total imports and exports in industry i at time t and Yit 
denotes output in industry i during year t.  OTHPENit denotes imports from all 
countries except low-wage economies. 
 
Bernard et al. (2006) find that both forms of import competition raise the probability 
of closure.  A one standard deviation increase in LWPEN increases the probability of 
plant exit by 2.2 percentage points which is considerably greater than the effect of 
OTHPEN.  Similar results are found by Greenaway et al. (2008) for Sweden.  In their 
results, the estimated coefficient on imports from outside the OECD is twice as large 
as that for OECD imports.  
 
Intra-industry trade is often found to have a positive effect upon firm exit.  As 
international trade grows firms diversify their product range which may lead them to 
enter new industries and exit sectors they operate in currently.  It has been established 
by Greenaway et al. (2008) that firms do not just closedown their operations, they 
switch to new industries too.  Using Swedish manufacturing data they find that intra-
industry trade leads to exit through plant closure, and, mergers and acquisition.  This 
is also found by Bernard et al. (2006) for the United States: firms which are 
confronted by low-wage import competition sometimes switch to more capital 
intensive sectors. 
 
Our measure of intra-industry trade is constructed using the Grubel-Lloyd index: 
 
                                                 
12 Countries are deemed to be low-wage where they have a GDP less than 5% that of Japan. 
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where GLijt is the Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade in industry i in year t, Xi 
are exports in industry i during year t and Mit are imports in industry i during year t. 
  
The industry variables mentioned so far capture the influence of globalisation upon 
plant exit.  We also include a measure of sunk costs.  The empirical literature has 
identified sunk costs as being an important factor in shaping exit.  Sunk costs also 
play a key role in determining exporting behaviour (Roberts and Tybout, 1997) and 
can affect the distribution of productivity in the industry (Aw et al. {2002}).   
 
Appendix Table 1: Industry-level Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Grubel-Lloyd index 144739 .50 .27 .01 1.00
   Trade that is intra-industry
Sunk costs 155714 .01 .01 .00 .05
   Minimum of entry and exit rates
Import competition 121760 .09 .09 .00 .67
   Imports divided by apparent consumption
LWPEN 121760 .03 .04 .00 .28
   Low-wage imports
OTHPEN 121760 .06 .06 .00 .55








  33Appendix Table 2: Multinational Interactions
Variable/Regression 1 2 3 4
Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
Multiplant MNE dummy 1.838 3.813 3.93 0.091
(4.86)** (17.70)** (18.25)** (6.75)**
Singleplant MNE dummy 1.631 1.619 1.623 1.691
(4.66)** (4.58)** (4.60)** (4.98)**
Domestic multiplant dummy 2.426 2.34 2.337 2.315
(15.43)** (14.88)** (14.85)** (14.62)**
Plant relative to firm variables interacted with the multiplant MNE dummy
Relative size 0.741
(7.25)**




Relative material intensity 0.839
(10.94)**
Plant Variables
Size 0.326 0.3 0.301 0.276
(24.08)** (28.11)** (28.11)** (34.70)**
Capital intensity 0.794 0.824 0.812 0.781
(10.10)** (7.50)** (9.11)** (10.77)**
TFP 0.574 0.566 0.568 0.56
(8.04)** (8.00)** (8.02)** (8.33)**
Wages 1.995 2.233 2.198 1.879
(8.40)** (9.61)** (8.45)** (7.58)**
Material intensity 0.753 0.744 0.745 0.795
(6.60)** (6.73)** (6.76)** (5.32)**
Firm Variables
Export dummy 0.987 0.995 0.993 0.979
(0.20) (0.08) (0.10) (0.31)
Import dummy 1.215 1.223 1.224 1.194
(3.03)** (3.08)** (3.11)** (2.71)**
R&D intensity 0.998 1.002 1.002 0.997
(0.57) (0.57) (0.68) (0.85)
Industry Variables
Grubel-Lloyd index 0.896 0.888 0.885 0.897
(0.79) (0.86) (0.88) (0.78)
LWPEN 1.046 1.053 1.049 1.043
(0.42) (0.49) (0.46) (0.40)
OTHPEN 0.911 0.9 0.898 0.915
(0.53) (0.60) (0.61) (0.50)
Sunk costs 0.956 0.958 0.958 0.956
(3.02)** (2.90)** (2.89)** (3.07)**
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log pseudo likelihood -31043 -31095 -31106 -30968
Wald Statistic 3432 3193 3228 3458
Number of observations 131669 131669 131669 131669
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Notes: Z-scores are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. The multinational dummy 
includes domestic and foreign multinationals.  The industry dummies include controls for the both the 
plant and firm's industry. **, * and + indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
confidence. 
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